The Peloponnesian War was a security dilemma where two states were not sure of each other’s intentions. Thucydides account of the second Peloponnesian War is a classic example in antiquity of what international relations studies. Thucydides in considered to be the inspiration for the realist perspective of international relations. Thucydides insisted that what made the conflict of the Peloponnesian war inevitable was the fear that Sparta felt as a reaction to the growth of Athenian power in Greece. Just like the Athenians the Spartans were afraid of the balance of power shifting in out of their own hegemony and into an Athenian one. The conflict in Epidamnus left the city-state of Corcyra and Corinth at war with each other and with the threat of Corcyra losing its vast naval support the Athenians chose to consolidate its power with its ally Corcyra and in doing so it snuffed the revolt at Potidaea, a colony founded by the Corinthians.
Sparta then went to war to keep the balance between the Greek city-states even. According to one of the Athenians greatest statesmen, Pericles the Athenians had no choice but to go to war the Spartans. The Athenians thought that the conflict was a result of their vast amounts of power that there was not much they could do after expanding to such a size. Thucydides’ retelling of the events that occurred during the war is characterized as a security dilemma which is a response to the anarchic organization of international politics. While some might see the Athenian motivation to go to war was merely a result of their pride and anger towards the other city states, however the Athenian situation could be explained to be an exercise in the rational organization of resources to build up their security. While the Athenians and the Spartans could have cooperated, it was highly unlikely that could have occurred because of the Prisoners Dilemma.
Before we can make any assumptions on the nature of the Prisoners Dilemma in regard to the Peloponnesian War we first must extrapolate upon the immediate and underlying causes for the war. The immediate cause for the war was because of the clash between the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans. Had both city states taken a had off approach to the conflict between these two Corinth would have likely conquered Corcyra and the large navy of the latter city state would have gone under Corinthian rule. This would have hurt the Athenians and the Spartans, the Athenians would have to fight to compete in the sea with a 2-1 balance of power in the favor of the Spartans, something that would have threatened the Athenian trade and tax dominance throughout the Greek state.
The Spartans would be hurt by such an affair as well because their hegemony is now threatened throughout with the Corinthians gaining power. The Corinthians were still allies of the Athenians with all things considered and the Spartans favored keeping the balance of power neutral rather than in anyone else’s. In sum, the immediate cause for the war was the Athenian-Spartan bid for consolidating their power and their sovereignty throughout Greece. In the Hobbesian anarchic organization, the states must do everything to consolidate their sovereignty and the survival of the state is always at odds with other states. This is why a security dilemma is extremely worrying for different states. Because is not sure of each other’s dilemma it is only rational for them to build up their own security in response that sort of knowledge.
Another immediate cause of the war that is not immediately taken into consideration when discussing such dilemma is that the Athenian power that Sparta feared was in fact stabilizing around the time when the war occurred. What was more of a bigger threat to Sparta and Athens was the potential slave revolts that could have sprung should the city states go to all out war. There was a risk involved for both city states, one that counters the “inevitability” of Thucydides and Pericles assertions. This immediate cause for the war might be just as important as the underlying causes. That is because it shows that both states had just as much as a choice as the other. After all these states are pools of humans all making decisions, all making choices, and each committed an error that led them to make certain choices. For example, the Corinthians did not expect the Athenians response due to its sheer anger at Corcyra. Pericles himself played too much of his hand by sieging Potidaea and punishing Megara with trade embargos.
With these mistakes on both sides, it made the Spartans reconsider the risk in going to war with the Athenians. There were limits to the knowledge that the Spartans and the Athenians know about each other and in turn it created a series of events that lead up to the war. One of these mistakes was the idea that war was inevitable in the first place. When Pericles said, “To recede is no longer possible for what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny, to take it was perhaps wrong, but to let it go is unsafe.” To Pericles and to Thucydides the war between Sparta and Athens was an inevitable event that could not be deterred. However, to assert this idea in the first place creates a situation where it is inevitable. To understand it is best to cycle back to the prisoner’s dilemma.
The reason Athens and Sparta could have not cooperated in the first place is because they both distrust each other. They both distrust what each other has to say and what outcomes will occur if they do trust each other. In the prisoner’s dilemma it leads to both prisoners creating a situation where they both confess because they see that the risks involved are greater than alternatives. Both realize they if they both confess than they have a better chance of being free and achieving the most amount of freedom possible. In a closed system, one where the prisoner’s dilemma happens with only once and on the last move it always most rational to defect and confess. In the case of Thucydides and Pericles them asserting that the war was inevitable only creates a situation where they think they are in the very last move of the dilemma, so they take the most rational outcome, that of defecting, or in the Athenian case, going to war.
Thucydides account of the war is inherently a realist one by nature. Both the Athenians and the Spartans were doing everything in their power to secure their sovereignty with the knowledge that the other has the potential to destroy one another. The state of nature between states is one of constant threat. It allows and encourages each state to provide and build their own security and in doing so may create more conflict. However even within the realist perspective the international state of nature is not as dangerous as the individual one. States provide the security of their citizens and the fact that states exist in the first place creates some sort of order. Conflict does arise despite this between states because of realist perspective on human nature. Humans are inherently egoist to the realist scholar and there will inevitably clashes between the two, creating more conflict.
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